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Price Asymmetry  in Spatial Fed
Cattle Markets
DeeVon  Bailey  and B.  Wade Brorsen
Price asymmetry in spatial  fed cattle markets  is investigated for three large markets
(Texas Panhandle,  Nebraska,  and Colorado) and one small market (Utah). Little
support  is found for the notion that equilibrium prices  for fed cattle are asymmetric
between  locations. However, adjustments  to price increases and price decreases  occur
at different  speeds.
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An issue examined in recent research is wheth-
er short-run  cash price adjustments are asym-
metric in the  sense that responses to price in-
creases  are  different  than  responses  to  price
decreases.  This  research  has  centered  on
whether price adjustments between levels of a
marketing channel are asymmetric (Kinnucan
and Forker;  Boyd and Brorsen;  R. Ward). No
research has examined the case of spatial cash
price  adjustments.  Spatial  price  adjustments
in cattle markets might be asymmetric for sev-
eral reasons including asymmetric adjustment
costs,  asymmetric  information,  market  con-
centration,  and  asymmetric  price  reporting.
Our purpose was to determine whether short-
run cash price adjustments of spatial fed cattle
markets are asymmetric. Like past research on
this issue, we tested for the existence of asym-
metry.  We  did  not  directly  test  hypotheses
about the  reasons for any  observed  asymme-
try.
The procedure used to test asymmetry is to
regress price  changes  in one  market  on both
the  positive  and  negative  price  changes  in
another  market.  This provides  a  measure  of
the relative  influence  of price  changes  (both
positive  and  negative)  in  one  location  on
another market location.  Two statistical tests
are conducted to determine if  (a) the total effect
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of positive  price  changes  and  negative  price
changes  are  equal and  (b) if the  speed of ad-
justment to positive and negative price changes
is the  same.
Factors Affecting  Price Adjustments
Even though the empirical  analysis used here
cannot formally test which of several possible
factors  is  the  cause  of any  asymmetry,  it is
important  to  establish  theoretical  reasons  to
expect  spatial price  adjustments for fed cattle
to  be  asymmetric.1 Four  possible  causes  of
asymmetry  discussed  are (a) asymmetric  ad-
justment  costs,  (b)  market  concentration,  (c)
asymmetric information,  and (d) asymmetric
price reporting.
Buyers (packers) and  sellers (feedlot opera-
tors) in fed cattle markets likely have different
adjustment  costs.  Meat  packers  invest  sub-
stantial  capital  in buildings  and  equipment.
Also, many meat packers are required by labor
contracts  to provide  a  minimum  number  of
hours for employees.  This makes  labor basi-
' We do not base our theoretical arguments on either the spatial
pricing  theory  of Greenhut,  Norman, and  Hang  or  the  perfect
market integration idea advocated by Ravallion.  Both  sets of re-
search share some common ideas with this paper. However, neither
spatial pricing theory nor perfect market  integration theory really
apply  to the  problem  we address.  For example,  spatial  pricing
theory is not based on the adjustment of market prices in different
locations as is investigated here but rather the reaction of  individ-
ual firms to changes in competitors'  prices. Also,  perfect  market
integration requires very restrictive assumptions that do not hold
for this dataset. These assumptions  include (a) homogeneous prod-
ucts in the various locations,  (b) the true model is exactly specified,
and (c) the prices  are measured  without error.
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cally  a fixed  cost  (McCullough).  Fixed  costs
are  large  enough  that  packers  are  willing  to
reduce  margins  significantly  in the short  run
to  keep plants  operating  by increasing  prices
for cattle to maintain volume (C. Ward  1987).
A packer could adjust output by changing line
speed or increasing  overtime or an additional
work shift either could be started or shut down,
but all these alternatives  are costly.
Feedlots  can adjust output by increasing or
reducing  marketings  in  the  very  short  run.
When  prices  decline,  feedlot  operators  must
establish  some expectation  of short-run price
trends  and judge  if delaying  cattle  sales  will
increase revenues. This also must be based on
many other factors including the condition of
cattle  ready  to  be  sold  (grade,  homogeneity,
etc.),  contract requirements,  feedlot  capacity,
and cash-flow requirements.
Once fed cattle reach  a desirable  grade, the
feedlot operator has approximately two weeks
to decide when to sell the cattle and still main-
tain quality  (Stenquist).  Most cattle  are  pur-
chased  on  a  liveweight  basis  and  priced  on
estimates  of lot quality  (average  pricing)  (C.
Ward  1987). This may allow feedlot operators
more latitude in selling decisions and may in-
crease their incentive  to withhold cattle  from
the market should prices fall.
Based  on  these  differences  in  adjustment
costs, feedlot operators may behave differently
than packers  when  prices  are either  rising or
falling.  For example,  packers  may raise  bids
quickly to compete with packers  in other re-
gions but lower bids more  slowly  in order to
maintain  volume.  The  costs  of adjustment
likely do not vary by location, so if asymmetric
adjustment costs were the cause of asymmetry,
all  locations  would  be  expected  to  respond
similarly.
R. Ward and Kinnucan and Forker suggest
market power might explain findings of asym-
metric price adjustments. Scherer argues price
inflexibility may exist in industries character-
ized  by  nonprice  competition,  high  market
concentration ratios, and large advertising ex-
penditures. For example, asymmetry could re-
sult if firms perceive a kinked demand curve.
The kink in the demand curve can result when
individual firms believe that no competitor will
match a price increase, whereas all firms would
match a price cut. The opposite is also possible
when the  individual firm  believes that  all its
competitors would match a price increase, but
none would match a price cut. Cattle markets
do not have large advertising expenditures nor
do they have much nonprice competition, but
they are concentrated on a regional basis [Quail
et al.; U.S. Department of  Agriculture,  Packers
and  Stockyards  Administration  (USDA,
P&SA);  C.  Ward  1982],  and  thus  price  re-
sponses might  be  asymmetric  due to market
power.
Concentration levels in the meat packing in-
dustry  are  high  on  a regional  basis.  For ex-
ample, the  1982 four-firm concentration ratio
(CR4) for fed cattle slaughter in the Texas North
Plains  was  98.7%,  Southwest Kansas  96.1%,
Eastern Nebraska-Northwest Iowa 75.1%, and
Central  Iowa  100%  (C.  Ward  1982).  Packer
concentration  in smaller markets is also high
(e.g.,  Colorado  96.5%,  Idaho  95.8%,  Minne-
sota 96.7%, and Utah 99.2%) (USDA, P&SA).
While the number of feedlots in the United
States has decreased markedly during the past
20  years,  the  remaining  or entering  feedlots
have increased dramatically  in size [U.S. De-
partment of Agriculture,  Statistical Reporting
Service  (USDA,  SRS)].  This implies concen-
tration  levels  in cattle  feeding  also  have  in-
creased.  However,  few  experts  believe  indi-
vidual feedlot operators  or  groups  of feedlot
operators have  any  market power  on a local
or  regional  basis  (Davis).  This  implies  that
market  power,  if it exists,  would  be  on  the
buyers' side.
Economists  such as Akerlof have long  rec-
ognized  the market inefficiencies  that can be
introduced  due  to  asymmetric  information.
The U.S. Department of Agriculture provides
considerable public cattle market information
(e.g.,  number  of cattle  on  feed,  marketings,
prices,  etc.).  Other private  sources  are avail-
able to firms,  or firms can  collect market in-
formation  internally.  Costs  associated  with
gathering both public and private information
include subscription fees, telephone and com-
puter charges,  salaries,  etc.2
Firms will likely invest in information (from
public  and/or  private  sources)  to  the  point
where  the  "cost  of search  is  equated  to  its
expected  marginal  return"  (Stigler,  p.  175).
When  market  participants  handle  large  vol-
umes of cattle,  the average  cost per head  for
information decreases.  Economies of size may
2 Some market information that may be valuable in buying and
selling decisions include current prices, transportation costs, mar-
ket shares  of buyers and sellers,  current and  projected near-term
marketings,  slaughter weights,  wholesale orders,  and other infor-
mation related to supply and demand  and market environment.
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play an important role in price discovery and
adjustment if  a combination of public and pri-
vate information is superior (more timely and
accurate)  to public information alone,  and/or
some  firms  are  more  efficient  in  analyzing
available information. This asymmetric infor-
mation could cause  asymmetric price  adjust-
ments.
Finally, there is the possibility that it is just
the  reported  prices  that  are  asymmetric.  A
spokesman  for a  large  buyer of broilers  once
observed  that "USDA market  reporters  may
not report discounted cash loads as quickly as
a higher priced load when the market is going
up" (Hayenga,  p.  48).
Data
Data for this study were weekly  quotes  from
June  23,  1979,  to April  16,  1986,  for choice
fed steers grades 2-4 between 1,100 and  1,300
pounds  liveweight.  The locations  considered
included Amarillo (Texas Panhandle),  Omaha
(Nebraska),  Colorado  and  Utah.  These  data
were for direct sales except for the Omaha ter-
minal  market.  The  data were  collected  from
the Western Livestock Marketing Information
Project  (1986),  the  Utah  Department  of Ag-
riculture, and U.S. Department of Agriculture
(USDA)  Livestock,  Meat and Wool  Market
News.
These locations were selected based on their
relative importance to the price discovery pro-
cess  for  fed  cattle.  Nebraska  and  the  Texas
Panhandle  represent  major  markets  for  fed
cattle with large weekly volumes. Colorado  is
also a relatively large market but smaller than
Nebraska and the Texas Panhandle. Utah is a
small and isolated fed cattle market with a high
packer  concentration  (CR4  of nearly  100%).
These markets represent a cross section of the
types of markets in which fed cattle are traded.3
Methods
Test for Asymmetric Prices
Weekly data were selected based on the avail-
ability  of official  price  quotes  from  USDA.
3 The market area for the Texas Panhandle corresponds  to mar-
ket  areas  delineated  by  C.  Ward  (1982).  The  Omaha  terminal
market was not included in C. Ward's study. Colorado and Utah
are markets  defined within  state  boundaries  based on  the infor-
mation  available to the researchers.
While  price  adjustments  may  take  place  in
shorter time periods, in a previous  study  we
still found leads and lags among prices in these
locations  using weekly  data.  The Texas  Pan-
handle was identified as the leading market for
fed cattle  prices between  1978 and  1983,  and
we  hypothesized  that  market  volume  and
packer and feedlot concentration on a regional
basis  affected the price  discovery  process for
fed cattle  (Bailey and Brorsen  1985).
We  conducted  the same  causality  tests  on
the data  used  in  this  study.  The  basic  rela-
tionships between the markets were the same
with the Texas Panhandle leading the market.
Consequently,  the asymmetry tests were con-
ducted by regressing price changes in the other
three  markets  on  Texas  Panhandle  price
changes.
Price differences  between central market lo-
cations generally have been smaller than trans-
portation  costs  (trucking and  shrink)  (Bailey
and Brorsen  1986). Price differences exceeding
transportation costs between locations are oc-
casionally observed  but usually exist for only
short periods of time. Factors other than trans-
portation  costs may affect these  adjustments.
However,  transportation  costs  appear  to op-
erate  as an  imperfect  upper bound  for price
differences  between  locations.  Consequently,
transportation costs serve as a proxy for influ-
ences besides cattle prices that impact the mag-
nitude of price  adjustments  but do not influ-
ence the speed of adjustment. A more complete
model  would include  weekly  market concen-
tration levels, live marketings, wholesale sales,
supply and demand of transportation services,
production  density,  and  marginal processing
costs.  Unfortunately,  these data are not pub-
licly available on a weekly basis. Consequent-
ly,  we relied on  the  price  and transportation
cost information  to include these implicit re-
lationships.
Kinnucan and Forker used a model  similar
to the  one  used here  except their model was
based  on different  theoretical  arguments  and
was  specified  using  price  levels.  Our model,
while  similar to Kinnucan and Forker's,  uses
first differences.  This model does not have se-
vere first-order autocorrelation like the model
with price  levels (Boyd and Brorsen).4
The selection of a first difference model was
4 Kinnucan and Forker and Boyd and Brorsen found their models
had autocorrelated  residuals.  R. Ward was unable to test for au-
tocorrelation since his data series was not continuous.
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based on the Dickey-Fuller  (DF) test for unit
roots.  This test is conducted as  follows:
(1)
parameter  estimates  of equation  (2)  together
with the associated  asymmetry tests.
Au,  =  )Ut-  + t,
where  Au, is the  first difference  of a series at
time t. Equation (1)  is estimated using ordinary
least  squares,  and the test is conducted using
a t-statistic  for  the parameter  "0"  (Nachane,
Nadkami, and Karnik). A first difference mod-
el could not be rejected at the  10% confidence
level for all four price series.
Based  on  the DF test,  the  specification  of
our model when prices are allowed to be asym-
metric and transportation costs are allowed to
vary is
K
(2)  PCjQ = a  + C bk TPPtk
k=O
K
+  ~  Ck  TPNt-k + TRAN  + e,,
k=O
where PCjt is the price  changes  for fed  cattle
in marketj (i  = Colorado, Nebraska, and Utah)
in time period  t (t  =  1,  ..  ., T);  TPP is the
positive price changes in the Texas Panhandle
from  period  t  - k  - 1 to  t  - k or  zero  if
negative; TPN is the negative price changes in
the Texas Panhandle from period t - k -1  to
t - k or zero if positive; and TRAN is changes
in USDA's  Office of Transportation monthly
truck  fleet  costs  in  cents  per  mile.  Weekly
transportation  cost  values  were  obtained  by
linear interpolation.
Akaike's Information Criterion was used to
select  the value  of k in equation  (2).  A lag of
one  week for Texas  Panhandle  price  changes
was found to be appropriate for all three mar-
kets (k = 1), showing that these fed cattle mar-
kets  adjusted  to  price  changes  in  the  Texas
Panhandle  within one week.
Like Boyd and Brorsen, this study tests two
asymmetry hypotheses. The first hypothesis is
that the total effect of price increases  is equal
K  K
to that of price decreases (:  bk =  2  ck)  The
k=O  k=0
second hypothesis  is that the speed of the ad-
justment  is the  same for both  price increases
and price decreases (b, = cl,..., bK = CK).  R.
Ward used a distributed lag with only one free
parameter,  so  he  could  not discern  between
these  two  hypotheses.  Kinnucan  and  Forker
only tested the  first hypothesis,  but they did
provide  some  information  about  the  second
using a procedure suggested by Rao and Miller
(pp.  174-76). The following section reports the
Results
The  results of the asymmetry  tests presented
in table  1 suggest price increases in the Texas
Panhandle  have more  immediate  impact  on
the other three markets than  price decreases.
This  is true since  the coefficients  for positive
price  changes  in the  current  week  (TPP, are
larger than the coefficients  for negative  price
changes  (TPN,).  The coefficients  for all  price
variables were statistically different than zero.
However, the transportation index was not sig-
nificant in any of the equations.  This may in-
dicate that changes in transportation costs were
so small  relative  to changes in actual weekly
supply and demand conditions that no statis-
tical relationship was found.
Positive  price  changes  during  the  current
week (TPPt)  have a coefficient statistically larg-
er than  one (F-test) for the Colorado  market.
This indicates an overreaction  in this market
to price increases in the Texas Panhandle. The
lagged positive Texas Panhandle price changes
(TPPt,  ) are significant in the Colorado and Ne-
braska  equations  but  have  negative  coeffi-
cients. This indicates that an adjustment is tak-
ing place during the second week after a price
increase.
Coefficients  for  the  current  week's  price
changes are much larger than for lagged prices
for both  positive and  negative  price  changes
(e.g., the coefficient for TPPt is larger than the
coefficient  for  TPPt_,)  for  all  three  markets.
This  indicates  most  of the  impact  of price
changes  in the  Texas  Panhandle  is  incorpo-
rated into price  changes in the other markets
within one week. This result confirms our find-
ing (Bailey  and Brorsen  1985)  that fed  cattle
markets adjust  quickly to  new price informa-
tion.
The coefficients for the Utah market [equa-
tion (5)]  are smaller  for the current week ad-
justments  and larger  for the  lagged  week ad-
justments  than  the  other  two  markets
(Colorado and Nebraska). This would suggest
that adjustments  in Utah tend to take longer,
on average,  than in the other markets.
The F-test of the hypothesis that the sum of
the coefficients for positive and negative Texas
Panhandle price  changes  are equal  cannot be
rejected for the three markets tested [equations
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Table  2.  Sums  of Coefficients  for First Dif-
ference  Model  of Spatial Fed Cattle Markets
Sum of Positive  Sum of Negative
Market Location  Coefficientsa  Coefficientsb
Nebraska  .824  .850
Colorado  .973  .971
Utah  .859  .756
a Sum of positive price change  coefficients from table  1, i.e.,  bo +
b,.
b Sum of negative price change  coefficients from table 1, i.e., c, +
C2.
(3)-(5)]. This implies that total impacts of neg-
ative  and positive price  changes in the Texas
Panhandle tend to have equal influence on the
other markets.
Although negative and positive price changes
appear to have  equal total effects between  the
Texas Panhandle and most of the other mar-
kets considered, the speed of adjustment is dif-
ferent. The F-tests for identical coefficients for
the positive and negative price changes reveal
that adjustments to positive price changes tend
to be made more  quickly (table  1).  As men-
tioned before,  there are  several  possible the-
oretical  reasons  to find asymmetry.  Since all
markets responded  similarly,  the most  likely
explanation  is asymmetric  adjustment  costs.
Packers may be more aggressive in buying and
contracting  cattle when  prices increase in an-
ticipation of tighter cattle  supplies.
Sellers  may also  sometimes  hold cattle  off
the  market  when  prices  decrease.  This  phe-
nomenon  had a major impact  on the market
during the  spring months of 1985  and  1986.
During these periods,  large  numbers  of cattle
were held in feedlots past their usual marketing
weights  due  to  falling  prices  (Western  Live-
stock Marketing Information  Project  1985).
Sellers must make some judgment regarding
the longevity of market trends, i.e., they must
make  current  marketing  decisions  based  on
current  prices,  recent  price  trends,  and  price
expectations. While sellers may have some dis-
cretion  regarding withholding  cattle from the
market, buyers are likely more constrained by
contract  agreements  and  plant  efficiency  to
continue  to produce.  Decreasing  prices  indi-
cate adequate  supplies of fed cattle, but prices
may drop more slowly if sellers hold cattle off
the  market.
The sums of the positive  (bo  +  b,) and neg-
ative  (Co  +  cl) price change coefficients  found
in table 1 were calculated and are presented in
OO  C
c  d cu
'a  o  c
4)
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table  2.  Taking the total impacts  of price  in-
creases and decreases  together,  little evidence
was found to suggest that asymmetry exists in
the long run between  major market locations
for fed cattle.  Total price adjustments upward
and downward are nearly equal. In all markets
examined,  reaction  to  price  increases  was
quicker  than  reaction  to  price  decreases,  in-
dicating  that  different  incentives  for  market
participants exist when faced with either price
increases  or price decreases.
Summary and Conclusions
This study found that spatial price adjustments
in fed cattle markets  are asymmetric.  Positive
Texas  Panhandle  price  changes  were  reacted
to faster than negative price changes. The total
effects  of positive and negative  price changes
in the price leading market (Texas Panhandle)
on the three other cattle markets were not sig-
nificantly different. The other markets includ-
ed a large  regional  market (Nebraska),  an in-
termediate-sized  market  (Colorado),  and  a
small market (Utah).
Price  adjustments  to new information  ap-
pear to be slower  in the  small  Utah  market.
This may indicate that buyers in the Utah mar-
ket need not be as aggressive in responding to
new price information as their counterparts in
the  major markets.  Lack  of competition  and
also  the  fact  that Utah  is  a  residual  market
may explain this more even adjustment. How-
ever,  buyers in Utah also eventually adjust to
price  information  in the other  regional  mar-
kets.
Price adjustments  in fed cattle markets  are
apparently  influenced  by  different  incentives
for market participants.  While overall impacts
of  positive and negative price changes are equal,
more information is needed regarding why the
speed of adjustment to price increases is faster
than to price decreases. This phenomenon may
represent an inefficiency where gains and losses
do not equally offset in the short run. However,
further investigation is needed to fully explain
why prices increase faster than prices decrease.
[Received June 1987; final revision
received May 1989.]
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